Red Sea Reckonings: The Unraveling Peace in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa, a region often overshadowed by crises elsewhere, is quietly teetering on the brink of renewed turmoil. Nearly two years after the Pretoria Peace Agreement was signed, intended to end the devastating conflict between Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the promise of stability is unraveling. Instead, fragile deals, entrenched rivalries, and ambitious maritime aspirations are deepening the peril across the Horn.

Broken Promises and Fractured Leadership in Tigray

The Pretoria accord, inked in November 2022, was lauded as a monumental breakthrough, offering a glimmer of hope for peace and recovery after a brutal two-year war. Yet, the implementation of its core provisions has largely faltered. Key provisions, such as the disarmament of Tigrayan forces, withdrawal of Eritrean troops, and resolution of contested territories, remain largely unmet. Transitional justice, inclusive dialogue, and the return of displaced populations—over a million people still in displacement camps with limited aid—have seen minimal progress.

The African Union’s Monitoring, Verification, and Compliance Mission (MVCM), tasked with overseeing the agreement, has been hampered by operational constraints and a critical lack of enforcement power. The international community, particularly the U.S., which played a key behind-the-scenes role in brokering the deal, has not maintained sustained pressure, leading to selective compliance and a profound erosion of trust.

Further complicating matters, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) recently revoked the TPLF’s legal status, a move widely perceived as deepening political rifts and closing vital avenues for dialogue. This stark gap between the Pretoria Agreement’s aspirations and the grim realities on the ground has bred widespread disillusionment among the Tigrayan public, whose hopes for peace and reconstruction have largely withered.

This disillusionment has fueled an internal reckoning within the TPLF, a party that once dominated Tigrayan politics for decades. The Pretoria Agreement, widely seen as a capitulation by many Tigrayans, has exposed deep fractures within the leadership. The party’s inability to present a unified front in negotiations with the federal government has severely undermined its standing.

These internal tensions dramatically escalated during the formation of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA). A significant rupture occurred in August 2024 when TPLF chair Debretsion Gebremichael unilaterally convened the 14th TPLF Congress, a move boycotted by Deputy Chair Getachew Reda, then serving as TIRA President, and other key reformist figures advocating for institutional renewal. This dissenting group, backed by youth, intellectuals, and elements of the diaspora, clashed with Debretsion’s faction, which sought to restore centralized control.

By April 2025, Debretsion’s faction, supported by senior military figures, had effectively seized control of the TIRA in what reformists termed a “palace coup”. Getachew Reda and his allies subsequently fled to Addis Ababa, with reports suggesting an armed regrouping in the Afar region, allegedly supported by elements of the federal military. Accusations of collusion with Eritrea flew from the federal government and Getachew’s camp against Debretsion’s group, while Debretsion’s faction accused Getachew of working with federal forces to fragment the TPLF.

In a pivotal development, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appointed Getachew Reda as Advisor on East African Affairs, a move seen as an attempt to co-opt a faction of the Tigrayan elite. Shortly after, Abiy appointed Lt. Gen. Tadesse Werede as Tigray’s interim president, a tactical shift in federal strategy. As Debretsion’s camp solidified its control in Mekelle, the Getachew-led bloc launched a new party in June 2025: Tigray Democratic Solidarity, or Semeret, which has since secured provisional registration with the election board.

This internal disarray, coupled with allegations of corruption, has further eroded the TPLF’s legitimacy among Tigrayans, all against a backdrop of rising Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions.

Ethiopia’s Maritime Ambitions and Regional Realignments

Amidst this internal fragmentation, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s maritime ambitions have emerged as a significant driver of regional instability. In October 2023, Abiy publicly declared Ethiopia’s intent to secure direct access to the Red Sea, framing it as an “existential” necessity for the landlocked nation [DW]. This declaration, while hailed by supporters as a long-overdue assertion of national interest, was widely seen by critics as a destabilizing departure from international norms.

The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland on January 1, 2024, was a highly provocative step. While the MoU reportedly grants Ethiopia coastal access in exchange for recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty, it provoked immediate and forceful backlash from Somalia, Eritrea, Egypt, and Djibouti. Egypt, already embroiled in disputes with Ethiopia over the Nile, condemned the move and deployed troops to Somalia. Djibouti, Ethiopia’s primary port access, explicitly rejected Ethiopia’s requests for an extraterritorial corridor, with President Ismail Omar Guelleh firmly stating, “We are not Crimea.”

Despite a temporary de-escalation with Somalia through Turkish mediation, which led Ethiopia to suspend the MoU, Addis Ababa’s core maritime calculus remains unchanged. Meanwhile, relations with Eritrea have sharply deteriorated. On Eritrea’s Independence Day in May, President Isaias Afwerki accused Ethiopia of “overt and covert acts of subversion,” eliciting harsh condemnations from Ethiopian officials who warned against continued violations of their sovereignty.

Abiy’s maritime pivot increasingly aligns with the regional ambitions of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), whose economic and military footprint in the Red Sea corridor has grown significantly. Analysts suggest Ethiopia now serves as a more viable partner for projecting Emirati influence, potentially counterbalancing rivals like Turkey, Qatar, and Iran. While Ethiopia is entitled to negotiate port access under international law as a landlocked state, these unilateral moves risk destabilizing an already fragile region, overshadowing cooperative frameworks like the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) [African Arguments].

The Breakdown of the Abiy-Isaias Alliance

At the core of the escalating tensions is the profound unraveling of the once-celebrated partnership between Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afwerki. Their 2018 Jeddah Peace Agreement, which earned Abiy a Nobel Peace Prize, was initially seen as a tactical alignment against the TPLF. However, this alliance fractured after the Pretoria Agreement, with President Isaias’s cryptic reaction – “ተኾለፍና” (“our mission has been thwarted”) – signaling a deep rupture rooted in diverging expectations about the war’s endgame. Subsequent border closures and cessation of diplomatic channels reflected a complete breakdown of trust.

Following Pretoria, both Ethiopia and Eritrea began to hedge against each other. Abiy’s Red Sea ambitions were interpreted by Asmara as a direct challenge. Isaias reportedly sought to build an anti-Abiy bloc by engaging Amhara militias like Fano, Oromo insurgents, and splinter TPLF factions. In retaliation, Addis Ababa is said to have supported Eritrean opposition groups, further inflaming tensions. Eritrea’s growing involvement in Tigray’s internal politics, particularly its backing of Debretsion’s faction, has further destabilized the region.

Amid these fractures, a new discourse known as ፅምዶ (Tsimdo), meaning “alliance,” has gained momentum, focusing on rekindling solidarity between the Tigrinya-speaking peoples of Tigray and Eritrea. This “people-to-people reunification project” is promoted through social media and is increasingly tied to post-Pretoria political realignments. 

A clear manifestation of this trend is the recent informal reopening of border crossings between Tigray and Eritrea, largely without the sanction of Ethiopia’s federal government. Eritrea’s tacit acceptance of these crossings, engaging directly with Tigrayan actors while bypassing Addis Ababa, suggests a calculated effort to reassert its influence by exploiting Ethiopia’s internal fractures.

Adding another layer of complexity is the ongoing civil war in Sudan. Eritrea has aligned with General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), while Abiy maintains close ties with the UAE, a key backer of the opposing Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The TPLF, for its part, has reportedly maintained cordial ties with al-Burhan. These overlapping alliances in Sudan mirror and magnify Ethiopia’s internal ruptures, highlighting the increasing entanglement of regional conflicts with domestic power struggles.

Ethiopia’s Deepening Internal Strife

Beyond the external dynamics, Ethiopia itself remains profoundly fragmented.

Oromia’s Contradictory Landscape

In Oromia, the post-Pretoria paradox is particularly glaring. Despite Oromo elites, including Abiy and his inner circle, replacing the TPLF as the dominant force in federal politics, the broader Oromo populace remains structurally marginalized. Opposition groups navigate a volatile terrain, distrustful of both the central government and potential allies, reflecting Ethiopia’s enduring “Gordian knot”—the struggle between multi-national federalism, centralized power, and contested national identity.

Amhara’s Unrestful Terrain

The Amhara region continues to be a hotbed of unrest. Fano insurgents and allied militias refuse to relinquish control over contested territories, despite the Pretoria Agreement’s call for their constitutional resolution. The federal government’s post-war demobilization efforts and actions perceived as economically targeted have fueled a sense of marginalization, leading to violent backlash and further fragmentation within Fano. While unlikely, tactical alignments have emerged between Fano militants and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in their shared opposition to federal forces, and even reports of TPLF-Fano contact suggest fragile convergences among disparate actors resisting central authority. However, these alliances are inherently unstable due to longstanding ethnic grievances and mistrust.

Afar: A Volatile Nexus

The Afar region is quietly emerging as a potentially explosive frontier. It hosts Eritrean opposition groups and a dissident Tigrayan faction, complicating an already fragile security landscape. Afar-Tigrayan tensions remain unresolved, particularly concerning the continued presence of Tigrayan forces in three disputed kebeles claimed by Afar authorities. The use of provocative terms like “ሓራ መሬት” (“Hara Meret” or “liberated land”) by this Tigrayan faction has inflamed local resentment [Martin Plaut]. Furthermore, the fragile suspension of the Afar-Issa conflict through federal mediation is precarious, and a high-profile defection of an Afar regional official to Eritrea has sharpened political fault lines. This strategic corridor, straddling Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, risks becoming the next axis of militarized competition.

The Imperative of Elite Consensus

The Horn of Africa presents a mosaic of failed states, contested sovereignties, and persistent conflict. Ethiopia, far from stabilizing post-Pretoria, faces new ruptures. The Abiy-Isaias alliance is dead, TPLF fragmentation deepens, and Eritrea now actively courts old enemies to check its former ally. Abiy’s maritime push, while failing to resolve domestic crises, stirs regional alarm.

Pretoria may have ended open warfare in Tigray, but it failed to heal Ethiopia’s deeper fractures. Violence festers in Amhara and Oromia, and the country teeters on the edge of renewed rupture. Even if open war is averted, the cycle of instability is set to persist unless Ethiopia addresses its foundational dilemma: the persistent failure to forge elite consensus.

Historically, Ethiopia’s trajectory—from imperial centralism to revolutionary socialism, EPRDF federalism, and Abiy’s post-2018 “reformism”—has consistently privileged coercion over compromise, exclusion over inclusion, and rupture over negotiation. As scholars like Jon Abbink and Merera Gudina have long argued, sustainable peace cannot rest on battlefield victories or top-down accords. It demands the political will among all elites to engage in genuine, inclusive bargaining. 

Ethiopia must move from existential contests to institutionalized compromise, requiring a radical shift in the structure of power: a reimagined federal settlement grounded in equity, pluralism, and meaningful decentralization, where governance is participatory and authority is accountable. Absent such transformation, the crises Pretoria sought to resolve will not only endure but deepen, threatening both the cohesion of the Ethiopian state and the future of peace in the Horn.

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